This paper constructs a labor transition model combining the features of job loss and job creation in the formal sector of an economy. The theoretical model examines the impact of trade liberalization on net job transition from formal to informal sector. In the light of our model we establish certain pre-conditions based on simulations under which trade liberalization is accompanied by rising informal sector. The model outcome conforms to the empirical evidence of rising informality with openness which we find in 18 Central Eastern European (CEE) and Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries.
I. Introduction
Most economies around the globe are characterized by the presence of an informal sector, which does not comply with government regulations, but contributes to the total volume of goods and services in a country 1 ; its size varying among nations, been relatively greater for developing economies than developed economies 2 . We find empirical evidence from 18 Central and East European (CEE) and former Soviet Union (FSU) countries that trade openness is positively related with the informal share of the gross domestic product (GDP) 3 . In this paper we build a theoretical model to analyze the impact of trade openness on the relative growth of the formal and informal share of total labor force. Our objective is to study the impact of trade reforms on labor market, particularly the degree of growth of informal labor share given certain economic preconditions.
The existing literature 4 on informal sector can be classified into two broad strands.
One group stresses on definition and measurement of informal sector and the other deals with policy issues related to informal sector. Policy issues can further be branched according to different approaches, such as new institutional or transaction cost, macroeconomic general equilibrium models etc. Macroeconomic general equilibrium models incorporating informal labor market (Agenor and Montiel, 1996; Carruth and Oswald, 1981; Marjit and Beladi, 2001; Rauch, 1991 etc) and computable general 1 This is a very lucid way to explain informal sector, which suffers from significant definitional, and measurement problems.
2 Scheneider and Enste (2000) give comprehensive measures of informal sector in countries from different regions around the globe. 3 We used Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) measurement of informal sector for empirical purpose 4 See Gerxhani (2003) for a detail literature survey on informal sector equilibrium (CGE) models (Schaefer, 2002; Gibson, 2005 etc) have also been used most extensively to derive macro policies related to informal sector.
The last two decades has witnessed the episode of trade reforms and liberalization in almost every corner of the world. Most of the existing work relating trade reforms with labor force has focused primarily on the wage differential between skilled and unskilled labor 5 . Feenstra and Hanson (1997) , Harrison and Hanson (1999) show that trade reforms and liberalization led to rising wage inequality in Mexico 6 . They analyze the impact of trade liberalization on factor prices of both skilled and unskilled workers in the formal labor sector. Yabuuchi et al. (2005) introduces an informal sector in the Harris-Todaro model, which provides industrial input to the formal sector, but their conclusion does not include the direct impact of trade reforms on informal labor sector. Agenor (2005) theoretically argues that if labor unions care sufficiently about skilled wage and if the degree of openness is sufficiently high, unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labor may actually fall in the long run. Marjit (2003) argues that the informal sector itself has labor-intensive and capital-intensive sub-segments. If economic reforms hurt the capital-intensive formal sector, it also leads to a contraction in the capital-intensive informal segment while employment and real wages rise in labor intensive part of the informal sector. A further analysis by Marjit and Kar (2001) provides an interesting result why mobility of capital is essential for making the process 5 If trade between developed and developing nation's leads to the North (i.e. developed) specializing in skill-intensive goods than it will raise the wages of the skilled labor in its country. The South (developing), specializes in goods which is less skill intensive compared to the North but is more skilled labor intensive compared to its rest of the economy. Thus wages of skilled labor rises in South also, leading to a growing wage inequality within both North and South. 6 An increase in the relative wage gap between white and blue-collared workers with trade has also been found for Australia, Japan, Sweden & the U.K. by Freeman & Katz (1994) , Katz et al. (1999) ; and for Hong Kong and the U.K. by Hsieh & Woo (1994) , Anderton & Brenton (1997) .
of reform a success. A greater degree of capital mobility helps to increase informal wage in case of contraction in the formal sector.
In a recent study, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on the informal labor force for two Latin American countries -Brazil & Colombia. They do not find any positive empirical results of trade liberalization, measured by reduction of tariff rates, on informality. In both of these countries trade reforms were simultaneously accompanied by labor market reforms, reducing the costs of firing and hiring formal workers. This introduction of more flexibility in the labor market contributed to a rise in the hiring of a formal workforce.
Our theoretical argument differs from the existing literature in two ways. First we forward a partial equilibrium analysis of labor market, considering both formal and informal share of labor. Second we do not consider wage differential as a source of ruralurban migration and growth of informal labor sector. Most of the existing literature is based on the impact of trade reforms on wage rate. We model the labor transition between formal and informal sector in terms of job loss and gain in only formal sector as a result of trade reforms. We consider the informal sector as the residual of the formal sector from total labor force, and find the impact of trade reforms on the size of informal share of total labor force. This motivates us to develop our theoretical model in section III, which analyzes the relative expansion of both formal and informal labor shares of the economy, in both the absence and presence of trade liberalization. In section IV we provide a brief policy discussion based on simulated results of our theoretical model and some concluding remarks thereafter.
II. Panel evidence from CEE and FSU Countries
One of the prime concerns of our empirical analysis has been the reliability of data on the informal sector. We find Kaufman and Kaliberda (1996) [ Table 1 ]
We estimate a panel of 18 CEE and FSU countries for the period 1990-1995. This is shown as equation (M) below.
In equation final consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP and finally we use C i dummy to capture the country fixed effect. We do not consider time fixed effect as there is much lesser variation expected over time in each of these 18 countries whereas the variation across the countries is comparatively much higher.
9 Alternative measures that could have been used were average tariff rates or tariff revenue to imports ratio; however such data for these economies were not available. As such we use the trade-to-GDP ratios. 10 Data sources are given in appendix 1.
We run three ordinary least squares regressions considering three alternate specifications of the base model (M) with the three measures of trade openness.
Empirical outcomes are shown in table 2. In the first column we use trade (as percent of GDP), second export (as percent of GDP) and third column import (as percent of GDP).
These are shown as model 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 in table 2, respectively. We find all three specifications of the trade openness measures are positive and statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level with informal share of GDP. We also find robust statistical support of FDI inflows being positive and significant in affecting the informal economy's size. The coefficient for urban labor force significantly increases the informal share of GDP, supporting the existing claim in literature that informality tend to grow faster in urban areas 11 . The government final consumption expenditure is found to be positive but insignificant. Overall we find strong statistical evidence that trade liberalization or openness significantly increases the informal share of GDP after controlling for the other relevant factors like urban share of total population, FDI inflows etc.
[ Table 2 ]
These robust empirical findings motivate us further into developing a theoretical framework where we analyze in detail the growth of both formal and informal labor shares of a country's total labor as it makes the transition from a closed economy to an open one. Before we proceed to our next section, we make one realistic assumption that informal share of GDP behaves in accord with informal share of total labor. This is just to 11 For detailed discussion see Portes et al. (1987) .
clarify the probable confusion one might have since our empirical support was based on informal share of GDP, but we model informal share of total labor.
III. Theoretical Model:
We start with a typical 2-economy model where one single economy, we call it home trades with the rest of the world. Let A ⊂ R + be the ordered set of n different sectors or industries in home country, where formal production takes place 12 . Thus home country is involved in producing n different commodities. The relative prices of these n industries compared to the rest of the world is given by the following inequality
Since A is an ordered set, we can order the sectors as A 1 , A 2 , ….A n where home country has highest comparative advantage in sector A 1 and highest comparative disadvantage in sector A n . Typical trade theory suggests home country will export commodities it has comparative advantage on, and import on which it has comparative disadvantage, if trade takes place. Lets assume A CA ⊂ R + be a sub set of A consisting of s comparatively advantageous sectors A 1 , A 2 , ….A s , and A CD ⊂ R + be another sub set of A consisting of n-s disadvantageous sectors A s+1 , A s+2 , ….A n in the home country. These industries produce their output using domestic labor force 13 and other factors of production.
Pure trade theory models like Ricardian or Hecscher-Ohlin are based on classical foundations i.e. there is full employment of labor. Since our purpose is to analyze the 12 Production which is accountable by the government or enters into national account calculations. 13 For the sake of simplification we assume that home country does not use foreign labor.
impact of liberalization on the informal economy, we assume there is less than full employment in home 14 .
The domestic labor force of the economy comprises of the aggregate formal workforce as well as the informal labor force 15 . In present period of time t, we have
Let k be the proportion of the economy's labor force in the formal sector and (1-k) in the informal sector. Thus formal laborers work in the formal sectors and informal laborers work in the informal sectors.
We have already defined formal sector consisting of comparatively advantageous or export sectors (s) and comparatively disadvantageous or import competing sectors (n-s).
We assume formal share of total labor force is absorbed in either export or import competing sectors. Since capital has no role to play in our model for simplicity we can simply write the output-labor mapping in period t as A 
where α is the proportion of the formal labor force in the sectors with comparative advantage and (1-α) been the proportion in the comparative disadvantageous sectors.
14 Since informal sector's output is not taken into consideration in estimating a nation's GDP, from national income accounting point of view informal sector is considered part of the unemployment labor pool. 15 For sake of simplicity we assume that home country does not use foreign labor.
(a) No trade liberalization
Initially we consider the situation where the home country does not embark on the route of trade liberalization. It imposes trade barriers throughout the economy in order to prevent the import competing sectors from external competition i.e. it is a predominantly closed economy. Over time the economy-wise industries expand. We first look at the demand side of labor market. Since the sectors in which home country has a comparative advantage are the ones in which it is an efficient producer, we assume the rate of expansion of A CA , γ is higher than the rate of expansion of A CD , δ .
Thus,
In period t+1 we have,
The size of the overall formal labor force in period (t+1) is now given by
The overall job creation in the formal sector over time is given by
Turning to the supply of labor in the economy, let g be the growth rate of the overall labor force. In period (t+1), t gL be the new labor force joining the economy.
Also let m be the fraction of the new labor force absorbed in the formal sector, in terms of the new jobs created there as shown above. The remaining fraction (1-m) of the new entrants in the job market goes to the informal sector. Moreover, let μ be the fraction of marginal informal workers who attains the skills required to work in the formal sector in period t. They also enter the formal sector at period (t+1). In this model, the supply of labor in the formal sector is constrained by the demand for labor. We treat the informal sector as the residual of the formal labor demand from total labor supply in any period.
The size of the informal economy in period (t+1) is given by
The additional jobs created in the formal economy absorb the combined supply of labor coming from the new entrants in the job market and the marginal informal workers. Thus, equating the new demand and supply of labor in (t+1) th period we have
The optimal size of the formal economy relative to the entire economy is given by Trade liberalization aims to promote an economy's exports to the world, creating employment opportunity and growth. Export promotion in the industries in which a nation possesses comparative advantage will lead to the expansion of the sector at a rate higher than if the sector only caters to the domestic internal market. As such we make the following assumption 16 .
The formal labor force with trade liberalization in period (t+1) is given by
The net employment creation in the formal sector is given by
As in the earlier section, we assume that g be the growth rate of the overall labor force, with tl m fraction of the new labor force absorbed in the formal sector and tl μ be the marginal workforce that makes the transition from the informal to the formal sector.
As such in the post-liberalization period the informal labor share of home country is comprised of three components. First, the existing informal workforce not absorbed by the formal comparative advantageous sectors. Second, the new labor force that does not 16 In a closed economy, an industry's productive capacity is constrained by its Production possibility frontier. But trade liberalization allows to produce beyond its PPF.
find employment in the formal expanding sector. Finally, the labor force released from the shrinking formal comparative disadvantageous industries. 
IV. Discussion
Our theoretical model is aimed to capture future possibilities of informal sector growth of a country given certain economic pre-conditions based on the structural parameters of our model. We perform simulations by varying the parameter values to forecast formal and informal labor logistic. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, to project the composition of the formal and informal sectors, as well as their relative shares both without and with trade liberalization and second, to use them for policy issues like when and why trade reforms can benefit a country most with lower informal labor growth.
[ Table 3 ]
The initial parameters for the baseline simulations are given in table 3. The average size of the informal sector during 1990-95, for the countries in our empirical analysis was 25%. We use k = .75 as the initial share of formal sector. The average unemployment rate during the same period for these nations was between 6 to 8 %. Trade liberalization leads to a contraction of the comparative disadvantageous sectors and hence job loss. As such we consider the value of tl δ to be .08. The percent of the new labor force joining the formal sectors can be assumed to follow the existing share of the overall formal economy, thus m = .75 and g, the growth rate of the labor force is given by actual average rate of growth of population in these countries. The initial value forα is considered to be .67. This means the home country in our theoretical model has comparative advantage in two-thirds of total existing sectors in the economy.
Graphs 1-6 shows the simulated projections for the informal and formal labor force along with their composition 18 . Table 4 provides summary results for all the simulations performed.
[ Table 4 ] 
V. Conclusion.
Recent empirical evidences pose considerable ambiguity on the relationship between pro-openness trade reforms and income inequality reduction (Easterly, 2001; Edwards, 1997) . Numerous studies looked at this issue from various angles, with different approaches. Our primary focus has been to use a relatively narrower policy perspective related to informal sector as a tool to serve the purpose of a broader aspect of trade and growth.
We find empirical evidence from 18 CEE and FSU countries that trade liberalization significantly increases the informal sector share of GDP. We acknowledge the fact that our measure of informality is the informal sector's contribution to the GDP as taken from Kaufman-Kaliberda (1996) ; and not the proportion of labor force in the informal sector, which we used, in our theoretical model. This does not affect the results to a great extent, as informal share of total labor force and informal share of GDP go hand in hand.
In our theoretical model we decompose an economy's industries into ones in which it has comparative advantage (disadvantage) relative to the rest of the world, and
show the change in the size of the formal (informal) labor force with and without liberalization. We make the assumption that the labor force released from the shrinking import competing sectors as a result of trade, goes entirely to the informal sector i.e. we do not consider direct labor movement between comparative advantageous and disadvantageous sectors. There is a time lag, which can be thought of as job search or job training. A share of that labor force comes back to formal advantageous as marginal informal workers possessing enough skills to join formal sector. 
